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CYBERSECURITY poses particular challenges to policy, 
policing and the public. Despite recent shifts in policing and 
security strategies, online victimisation is a major and growing 
problem for the Scottish criminal justice system. This article 
seeks to situate these challenges in the context of historical 
changes in criminal justice strategies and to suggest why these 
may be less effective in the case of cybercrime.
Through the 1980s and 1990s, state approaches to security 
in the UK saw fundamental change, with the increasing retreat 
of the state from security provision. Alongside the privatisation 
of various policing and security functions, policy moved towards 
‘responsibilisation’, a shifting of the onus onto individuals to 
seek out their own security solutions from a market of private 
providers and multi-agency networks. This included the rise 
of ‘situational crime prevention’ responses: better household 
locks, CCTV, household alarms, public awareness campaigns, 
which claimed to reduce crime while providing a new area of 
exploitation for the growing private security industry (Garland, 
2001). Similar attempts to ‘responsibilise’ the Scottish public’s 
cybersecurity behaviours are not taking hold to the same 
extent. The Scottish Household Survey suggests that, while the 
majority of respondents took at least some precautions online, 
only 31% of Scottish adults regularly changed their online 
passwords, 40% backed up important information and 62% 
had up-to-date antivirus software, with deprived communities 
even less likely to take measures to protect themselves online 
(Scottish Government, 2016). 
Three key features of cybercrime and cybersecurity in 
Scotland contribute to the limited success of cybersecurity 
responsibilisation strategies compared to ‘terrestrial’ ones. 
First, the landscape of cybersecurity services and knowledge in 
Scotland and elsewhere is heavily fragmented. Second, security 
is just one of a number of competing agendas in the design and 
use of internet-mediated services. Third, barriers to conventional 
criminal justice responses to crime challenge preconceptions 
about the meaning and experience of victimisation. 
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Repairing the Black Mirror; a fractured landscape for 
cybersecurity provision
In 2015 the Scottish Government published its first strategy 
addressing perceived risks from the ‘online world’, a major aim 
being the reduction of victimisation through user education. 
Public awareness of cybercrime has increased in recent years, 
but the extent to which campaigns like ‘cyberstreetwise’ have 
reduced levels of victimisation or increased individual security 
is unclear. Although the final report boasts over 2 million 
adults using ‘safer online behaviours’ since 2014, there remain 
numerous people who are not reached by the messages. 
Multi-agency partnerships are a key part of the landscape, 
with inter-institutional communication continuing to develop 
and expand. However, this is more developed in some areas 
than others. The centralised nature of these partnerships in 
the UK compared to other developed countries, has allowed 
for quicker development of effective information sharing 
relationships. However, the inertia of pre-existing professional 
networks and a ‘congested landscape’ present obstacles to 
less powerful targets, who often lack the social, cultural or 
economic capital to enter the conversation (Levy and Williams, 
2013). 
While bigger businesses generally have in-house experts 
or access to the market of expertise, smaller businesses 
and individuals may encounter considerable difficulty in 
the ‘lemon market’ (Holt et al, 2016) of cybersecurity. In this 
asymmetric informational relationship, SMEs and individuals 
are disempowered by the confusing array of private and state 
providers, security standards and solutions, especially where 
risks are hidden or poorly understood. As emphasised by 
Loader and colleagues (2015), organisations and individuals 
balance security with a competing array of values and interests 
(for example, profit, usability, culture), and security benefits 
can often seem intangible. The competing agendas that have 
emerged in the information economy present barriers to 
participation for less empowered individuals and businesses. 
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This cannot be easily solved through better networking of the 
‘key players’ or message harmonisation: these people need to 
be brought into a conversation about security that addresses 
their needs and perspectives. 
Conflicting agendas; the monetisation of insecurity
The aims of cyber-awareness strategies are ambitious: the 
behavioural shifts in question cannot be reduced to minor 
adjustments, but rather are attempts to transform a complex 
culture around technology that has been developing for 
decades. Connected to these strategies is the continuing 
privatisation and commodification of policing and security. 
Along with the responsibilisation rationale, the incursion of 
the private sector into the realm of government and police 
has been marked. Furthermore, the interests and agendas of 
private sector providers of online services do not always align 
with those of crime control and security. 
The public are encouraged to share personal information 
online, driven by advances in usability that make sharing 
increasingly convenient and seamless. The already complex 
relationship between usability and security is further 
problematised by this shift to ‘surveillance capitalism’ - the 
commodification of data to drive advertising and customer 
targeting (Zuboff, 2015). Seamless sharing is encouraged 
despite the security risk it poses to individuals: similarly, the 
public are discouraged from using adblockers despite the fact 
that online adverts are potent malware vectors (Sood and 
Enbody, 2011).
Quitting social media entirely is not a realistic solution 
for many people, and while corporations’ business models 
incentivise them to encourage insecure behaviours this 
conflict of agendas is likely to remain intractable, undermining 
‘responsibilised’ approaches to combating cybercrime.
Discussed elsewhere in this issue in more detail are the 
challenges cybercrime presents to policing, so it is enough to 
highlight that the mandate of the police is situated in a context 
of conflicting and competing agendas. Where priorities are 
dictated by seriousness, guided by targets and limited by 
resources, the nature of cybercrimes as the public experience 
them inevitably leaves them lower on the list of priorities.
Victim perspectives and the problem of “too much 
awareness”
Victimisation of internet-mediated crime has undeniable 
qualitative differences to conventional victimisation. These 
differences pose a number of challenges to responders: victims 
may often be unaware that they have been victimised and, 
even where this is not the case, it may not be immediately 
apparent to whom they should report a crime, with service 
providers, banks and the police all potentially playing a role in 
reporting and redress. The scale of online victimisation makes it 
impossible for police to address individual complaints in a way 
the public have come to expect. With few cases successfully 
prosecuted, justice is seldom as evident as with conventional 
forms of crime, and, in the case of financial crime, courts and 
police are no longer the primary providers of redress and 
security.
Placing the onus on the individual to seek out security 
from a “market” of providers presupposes that businesses 
and members of the public respond to crime rationally. 
Models of actors as rational agents may have some utility in 
explaining victimisation patterns online, but from a victim’s 
perspective, the assumption that education and awareness-
raising automatically lead to the adoption of safer behaviours 
is problematic. In addition to competing with other social and 
cultural pressures, varying degrees of self-efficacy and a ‘lemon 
market’ of ‘solutions’, recent research in the United States has 
highlighted the possible damage too much ‘awareness’ can 
induce. Stanton (et al, 2016) have identified ‘security fatigue’ as 
an issue, where frequent risk ‘messages’ leave people feeling 
hopeless, incapable or indifferent. Moreover, discourse around 
crime online tends to be framed in financial terms. As Garland 
(2001) points out, in a consumer society the ‘price of crime’ for 
individuals and organisations is easily construed as just another 
cost of late-modern living. 
Culture of Ctrl+Alt+Del? 
Garland (2001) describes responsibilisation as part of a 
‘culture of control’ by which the state decentralises governance 
of its citizens, exercising power indirectly through a network 
of agencies, private services and public bodies. In the case of 
cybercrime, the fractured and confusing landscape of providers, 
competing agendas and problematic constructions of 
victimhood and risk represent barriers to the adoption of secure 
online behaviours. As a result, marketised solutions focused on 
individual behaviours face several barriers to success, even on 
their own terms. 
These behaviours are a product of wider economic, social 
and cultural relations: the development of a cyber-resilient 
Scotland will require a strategy that addresses this complex 
landscape. It will need to account for structural and individual 
inequalities in a digitally divided society that places heavy 
emphasis on the market for its security provision. Moreover, 
it will need to harmonise its cybersecurity messages and also 
establish a national understanding of what ‘cybercrime’ entails, 
opening up the conversation to include those who face barriers 
to securing themselves online, including new ways of talking 
about these problems which meaningfully speak to how the 
public adopt and experience these changing technologies.
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